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An Australian perspective on inflation targeting, 
communication and transparency 
Malcolm Edey 
1. Introduction 
When countries began to adopt inflation targets more than a decade ago, their aim was to 
put in place a credible framework that avoided the drawbacks of previous policy regimes. In 
New Zealand, Canada and Australia, inflation targets replaced ad hoc regimes that were 
considered intellectually unsatisfactory and had been associated with periods of poor 
inflation performance. In the United Kingdom and Sweden, inflation targeting replaced failed 
exchange rate pegs. In each case, the designers of the new targets sought a balance 
between constraining the central bank in terms of policy outcomes, and allowing a realistic 
degree of flexibility in the setting of the policy instrument. 
Kuttner (2004) notes that, even at this early stage, there was no single model as to how this 
balance should be achieved. Target specifications differed in a number of ways, including the 
inflation goal itself, the degree of flexibility they allowed for inflation to vary, and the exact 
accountability and communication arrangements that were put in place. Australia’s targeting 
regime could be characterised as being at the flexible end of the spectrum, while those of 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, in their initial formulations, were at the more tightly 
specified end. Subsequent adopters have continued to be spread out along this range. 
This paper provides a perspective on Australia’s experience as a flexible inflation targeter. It 
first reviews the historical background to Australia’s adoption of inflation targeting. It then 
compares Australia’s communication practices with those of other central banks in order to 
bring out the similarities and differences in current approaches. Finally, it looks in more detail 
at the role of inflation forecasts in communication strategy, which seems to be at the heart of 
current differences of approach among inflation targeting central banks. The paper argues 
that the flexible approach has served Australia well, and that the case for a relatively flexible 
approach by inflation targeters more generally is likely to strengthen as countries build up an 
increasing track record of low and stable inflation. 
2. Historical  background 
The adoption of inflation targeting in Australia is traditionally dated to 1993, when Governor 
Fraser began to speak of the objective of holding inflation to a rate of 2-3% “over the course 
of the cycle”. Debelle and Stevens (1995) note that this objective was adopted “without 
fanfare”. Unlike in New  Zealand and Canada, there was no attempt to signal an abrupt 
regime shift, and there was no formal agreement at the time between the government and 
the central bank (this came later, in 1996). Rather, the RBA was signalling its medium-term 
inflation goal within the context of existing institutional arrangements. 
Intellectually, there was a lively debate at the time on alternative monetary policy regimes for 
Australia. Monetary targeting had been abandoned (or, officially, “suspended”) in 1985, when 
it had become clear that, as a result of financial liberalisation and innovation, the monetary 
aggregates no longer bore a stable relationship to prices or nominal incomes. There had 
followed a period in which the RBA’s policy approach was presented to the public in terms of 
an ad hoc “checklist” of indicators. Many commentators argued that this approach lacked 
coherence and failed to provide the needed discipline. 4  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
Among the alternative monetary regimes put forward in the Australian debate were a fixed 
exchange rate or currency board (eg Walters (1992)), introduction of a commodity-standard 
currency (White (1989), Evans and Dowd (1992)), a “free banking” regime with competing 
private currencies (Dowd (1990)), monetary base control (McTaggart and Rogers (1990)) 
and a return to conventional monetary targeting (Weber (1994)). In short, the debate threw 
up a surprisingly diverse range of proposals, indicative of widespread distrust of monetary 
discretion. There were, of course, counterarguments to each of these proposals.
1 A fixed 
exchange rate had already proven unsatisfactory given Australia’s position as a commodity 
exporter with highly variable terms of trade. The monetary aggregates, as noted, were too 
unstable to serve as an intermediate policy target. And the currency reform and free banking 
proposals were radical and untried. In this environment, thinking within the RBA was moving 
towards accepting the logic of targeting the ultimate objective of policy (namely, inflation) 
rather than an intermediate objective like the monetary aggregates or the exchange rate. 
The particular formulation adopted in 1993 reflected pragmatic considerations at the time. 
Inflation in Australia had already been substantially reduced as a result of tight policies in the 
late 1980s. With the economy now in the early stages of recovery from recession, there was 
no appetite for a strategy of deliberate further disinflation. Rather, the aim was to prevent 
inflation from rising unacceptably during the prospective expansion. The formulation of the 
target as “2-3% on average over the cycle” was intended to allow for unavoidable short-term 
variation in inflation while providing a medium-term discipline on the policy process. A 
noteworthy feature was that the 2-3% range was not intended to specify outer limits, but 
rather to convey the idea of an approximate central tendency, or “thick point” as Debelle and 
Stevens called it. Thus it was expected that inflation would fluctuate around the target but 
would average between 2% and 3% over a run of years. For technical reasons, the target 
was originally specified in terms of an underlying inflation measure in order to ensure that 
mortgage interest rates were excluded from the targeted index. When interest rates were 
later removed from the official CPI, the target was restated as applying to the CPI itself rather 
than the underlying rate. 
All of these features were well established by the time the target was given formal 
recognition in an agreement between the Governor and Treasurer in August 1996. As well as 
specifying the numerical target, the agreement established standards for reporting and 
accountability through regular policy statements and, importantly, through twice-yearly 
appearances before the federal House of Representatives Economics Committee. Over the 
course of time, these vehicles of communication and accountability have become more 
highly developed. Statements have become more detailed and explicit about the inflation 
outlook, and the regular parliamentary appearances have gained in prominence. 
In international terms, Australia’s inflation targeting regime lies at the flexible end of the 
spectrum and has sometimes been criticised for that (particularly in its early years). It has 
never had the strict fluctuation bands or disciplinary procedures for breaches that were used 
as credibility-building devices in other countries like New Zealand. Critics from an academic 
perspective, such as Stemp (1997), argued that the target gave too little discipline against 
higher inflation. In part, this type of criticism reflected a general disaffection with discretion 
and the unsatisfactory results it had delivered in the 1980s. It was argued that discretion 
would lead to policy errors and hence macroeconomic volatility. There was also an appeal to 
the time consistency literature, which argued that discretion would lead to systematic policy 
bias, generating a higher than optimal average inflation rate. But these criticisms tended to 
die down as Australia’s targeting regime built up a track record of inflation control. 
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3.  Is there an optimal degree of flexibility? 
Having noted that inflation targeting regimes take quite different approaches to the tolerance 
of inflation variability, it is interesting to consider what economic reasons might be given for 
preferring a greater or lesser degree of flexibility in this regard. In the terminology of 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), inflation targeting is a form of “constrained discretion”, and 
both the constraining and the discretionary elements can be viewed as having costs and 
benefits that need to be balanced in designing the specifications of the policy regime. The 
need for a discretionary element arises from the impossibility of specifying in advance how 
the policy instrument should be adjusted in response to every contingency. The case for 
placing this within a framework of constraints is the familiar one from the time consistency 
literature: constraints help to establish credibility by preventing discretion from being used to 
permit higher than optimal inflation. Strictly speaking, of course, the time consistency 
literature does not require the type of simple constraint specified by inflation targeting. The 
key requirement of a credible policy is pre-commitment, and in principle this could be 
achieved by a complex or time-contingent rule rather than by a simple one. However, it may 
well be that in the public’s minds, simple rules that provide clear guidelines as to what 
constitutes a breach are more readily understood and provide a more effective discipline on 
the policy process. 
It follows from this reasoning that decisions about the appropriate degree of flexibility in an 
inflation targeting regime will depend on judgments as to the relative priority that needs to be 
given to credibility-building. Where there is a recent history of unsatisfactory performance or 
regime failure, greater emphasis is likely to be placed on specific credibility-building features 
such as tight target ranges and penalties for breaching the target. In cases where credibility 
is already well established, these features are likely to be less important. This is one factor 
that probably made it easier for Australia to adopt its flexible approach, since inflation had 
already been reduced to a satisfactory rate at the time the target was introduced. 
The New Zealand experience provides a further case in point. As the first country to 
introduce inflation targeting, and with inflation still higher than desired, New Zealand initially 
adopted a tightly specified model with narrow and quite ambitious bands (0-2%), a fixed 
timetable for achieving it, and with penalties specified for a breach. Later, with low inflation 
expectations becoming well entrenched during the course of the 1990s, the New Zealand 
authorities made a number of changes to the regime specification to allow greater flexibility. 
These included changes to the target bands (now 1-3%), and a re-specification of the target 
as a medium-term average along the lines of the Australian approach. In some respects, the 
UK framework too, in its mature form, allowed more scope for inflation variability than did the 
initial formulation adopted in 1992. As a general principle, it seems that the scope for 
flexibility in the regime is greater where inflation expectations are well anchored. 
4. Communication  and transparency 
Another important area for comparison among inflation targeting central banks is in their 
approaches to communication and transparency. There is no doubt that central banks 
around the world have greatly increased the volume and quality of information they provide 
to the public. These changes, which have generally taken place over the period since the late 
1980s, have gone hand in hand with the evolution of the policy framework itself. Current 
reporting practices among a range of advanced-country central banks are compared in 
Table 2, reproduced from the 2004 Annual Report of the BIS. 




Provision of information by central banks 
G3 Inflation  targeters 
 
United 







lia  Sweden Switzer-
land 
Accountability           
Quantitative 
inflation 
objectives   No   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Reports to 
legislature   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Policy 
decisions           
Decisions 
announced 
immediately   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Press 
conferences   No   Yes   Yes   No   No   Yes   No   Yes   Yes 
Press 
releases   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Minutes 
published   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   –   –   No   Yes   No 
Precise 
voting results 
published   Y e s    N o    Y e s    Y e s    –    –    N o    Y e s    N o  
Economic 
assessments           
Reports on 
monetary 
policy   H   M   M   Q   Q   Q   Q   Q   Q 
Forecasts 
released   H   H   H   Q   Q   Q   Q   Q   H 
Quantitative 
risk assess-
ments   No   No   No   Yes   No   No   No   Yes   No 
Notes: M = monthly; Q = quarterly; H = half-yearly. 
Source: BIS, 74th Annual Report, June 2004. 
 
A few general observations can be made about the comparisons in Table 1: 
•  In all cases, the major central banks publish regular reports on the economy and 
monetary policy, usually quarterly. While they differ somewhat in style and length, all 
give a fairly comprehensive review of the central bank’s thinking about economic 
conditions and prospects. 
•  Similarly, all of the major central banks now publish economic forecasts, though 
some (Canada and the ECB) have begun to do so only quite recently. The majority BIS Papers No 31  7
 
 
of central banks present their forecasts quarterly, though a significant minority 
(including the three largest) present them half-yearly. The forecasts generally focus 
on inflation and GDP growth, with a small number of additional macroeconomic 
variables also included in some cases. 
•  Practices on the release of minutes from the monetary policy decision-making 
committees differ from country to country. Australia is one of a number (along with 
Switzerland and the ECB) where minutes and voting records are not released. In 
Canada and New Zealand, the question of minutes does not arise because 
monetary policy decisions in those countries are not taken by a committee but are 
the responsibility of the Governor. In the other countries included in the table, 
minutes are released with lags ranging from around two to eight weeks. 
•  In all cases, the central banks make public announcements when a policy change is 
made. Even a casual perusal of these statements, however, indicates that they differ 
quite markedly in format and content. Federal Reserve Board and Bank of England 
announcements, for example, are typically brief and, in the Fed’s case, make heavy 
use of standard verbal formulas to describe the current assessment. Those in 
Australia, New Zealand and some other countries generally give a fuller and less 
formulaic account. 
•  In addition to the announcement of policy changes, most central banks also make 
announcements when a no-change decision is made. However, not all give an 
accompanying statement of reasons (included in this category are the RBA and the 
Bank of England).
2 
These comparisons suggest three points on which significant variations in practices exist 
across the major central banks. The discussion below reviews two of these issues – the 
frequency of communication and the release of minutes and voting records – which have 
recently been the subject of debate in Australia. A third issue, concerning the role of inflation 
forecasts as a communication tool, is considered in detail in Section 5. 
The first point concerns the handling of no-policy-change announcements. There have been 
calls recently in Australia for these to be accompanied by detailed explanatory statements, 
while the RBA has maintained a practice of issuing such a statement only when a change is 
made (in addition to the regular quarterly reporting schedule). In economic terms, the 
argument for existing practice is probably best viewed as part of the broader question as to 
the optimal frequency of communication. In Australia’s case, as noted above, the explanatory 
statements that accompany changes in policy give a broad and somewhat fuller summary of 
the prevailing situation than is typical of the equivalent announcements of some of the larger 
central banks. A practice of issuing similar statements for no-policy-change decisions would 
mean issuing them at the same frequency as board meetings: ie effectively moving to a 
schedule of monthly commentaries in addition to the (much more detailed) quarterly reports 
already produced. 
The economic issue here is whether the flow of genuine new information is sufficient to justify 
that degree of frequency. One possible response to this question would be simply to take the 
view that the more communication, the better. Supporters of this view would argue that since 
information reduces uncertainty, additional communication is always either beneficial to the 
public (and to financial markets) or, at worst, redundant if there is nothing of substance to 
communicate. However, in addition to the theoretical caveats to this view, most participants 
in the debate would accept that there is some limit to this argument in practice. No one 
argues for weekly, daily or continuous commentary from central banks, so in principle there 
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is some optimal frequency of communication. One important reason for this is that 
communication is imperfect and, therefore, inevitably noisy. The shorter the interval between 
communications, the less genuine information there is likely to be. At some point, excessive 
frequency of announcements risks generating more noise than signal. 
It is not hard to think of instances where central banks have had to grapple with this problem. 
The recent experience of the Fed, for example, saw some delicate manoeuvring when the 
time came to move away from the “considerable period” rhetoric adopted in 2003.
3 The 
communication challenge for the FOMC during the early part of that period was to convey, 
essentially, that the policy assessment was not materially changing between successive 
meetings; in other words, to convey a lack of new information. In general, one way to 
approach this task would be to come up with an entirely new statement each time, aiming to 
create broadly the same impression with different words. However, this approach has the 
drawback of attracting attention to the changes in wording and inviting markets to read more 
into them than is really there. Presumably, this is why the FOMC opted for the alternative 
approach of sticking to a fixed form, though at the cost of generating even greater 
speculation about when and how the formula would eventually be changed. No doubt this 
kind of awkward communication challenge can never be entirely avoided, but it is at least 
arguable that problems of this nature can be amplified by too great a frequency of 
communication. 
In the context of this debate, there is also an interesting empirical question as to whether an 
increase in reporting frequency would be likely to generate significant economic benefits in 
the form of a reduction in financial market uncertainty. In the Australian situation, where 
monetary policy statements appear quarterly, a simple approach to this question would be to 
ask whether the build-up of information between quarterly statements was generally 
sufficiently large that those statements would be expected to have a material impact on 
financial markets when released. If so, a move to more frequent statements would 
presumably allow that information to be incorporated into financial prices more quickly than 
under current practices. This question has been examined by Coppel and Connolly (2003), 
who show that, for maturities out to about two years, the average movements in short-term 
market interest rates on the days when a quarterly Statement on monetary policy (SMP) is 
released are not much larger than on ordinary (non-SMP) days. So this evidence is not 
consistent with a significant accumulation of pent-up information between successive 
quarterly reports. This result is likely to reflect the existence of other reporting vehicles such 
as governors’ speeches, parliamentary hearings and media releases that become available 
in the intervening periods. 
The second point concerns the varying practices with respect to the release of minutes. This 
has also been a subject of some debate in Australia and elsewhere, most notably in relation 
to the ECB. The debate concerning disclosure of minutes by the ECB is illustrative of the 
broad lines of argument. Observers such as Buiter (1999) have argued forcefully for 
disclosure of minutes and voting records by the ECB’s governing council, based on a general 
appeal to principles of accountability and the public’s right to be kept informed. In effect, this 
form of disclosure would shift the ECB system from one of collective accountability (through 
the ECB President) to one where each member would be individually accountable for his or 
her vote, as is the case with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. 
The argument against this form of disclosure has hinged on the possible effects it might have 
on the decision-making process. The ECB (Issing (1999)) defends its current practice on the 
basis that disclosure of voting records would expose individual members of the governing 
council to pressure to vote according to their national interests rather than the interests of the 
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currency area as a whole. While not universally accepted, it is widely acknowledged that this 
argument has merit. For example, Blinder et al  (2001), though supporting a general 
presumption of disclosure in their overall approach to central bank communication, do not 
recommend release of minutes and voting records in the ECB’s case. 
In Australia, the terms of the argument have been slightly different, since there is no 
Australian counterpart to the multinational structure of the ECB’s Governing Council. The 
RBA situation is, however, unusual in another respect, in that policy is decided by a non-
executive board where the majority of members are not technical experts on monetary policy 
or engaged on a full-time basis in the policy process. These points were raised at one of the 
RBA’s recent parliamentary examinations, with the Governor noting that the Board members 
are chosen to reflect the broader sectors of the community and could be exposed to pressure 
to vote on the basis of sectional interests if their votes were disclosed.
4 Thus, while the 
situations of these two central banks are not the same, the general point that has been made 
in both cases is that questions about accountability and disclosure practices cannot be 
examined in isolation from the governance arrangements of each institution. A disclosure 
practice that makes sense for a technically focused monetary policy committee might not be 
well suited to alternative board structures. 
Empirical evidence 
There has been much debate in recent years as to whether different transparency and 
reporting arrangements can be shown to have significant effects on economic performance. 
One study to attempt a quantification of monetary policy transparency is Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2002), who rate nine major central banks based on the authors’ assessment of their 
performance in relation to a range of communication criteria. These include: clarity and 
precision about goals; the release of minutes and voting records from policy meetings; 
openness in relation to the data and models used to guide economic analysis; and 
forthrightness in ex post examination of policy choices. Even leaving aside the unavoidable 
subjectivity of ratings on many of these criteria, a major issue with such an index concerns 
the arbitrariness of the combination of these different components into a single index, which 
Eijffinger and Geraats do using equal weights. 
A similar index of the transparency of 20 inflation targeting central banks, again based on an 
equal weighting of separate ratings of various aspects of each bank’s inflation report, has 
also been produced by Fracasso et al (2003). An innovation of their approach is their use of 
a group of five graduate students in economics, “familiar with broad principles but not 
necessarily central bank watchers”, to rate each bank’s report. This approach is aimed at 
avoiding any subconscious contamination of the results by the authors’ own knowledge of 
the operations and performance of each central bank. Among a range of drawbacks 
identified by Lowe (2003), however, is that such a group may be quite unrepresentative of 
the intended audience of central banks’ reports. Finally, an alternative index of the 
transparency of the central banks of 87 countries, focused on the quality of their published 
forecasts, has also been produced by Chortareas et al (2002). 
Empirical applications of these indices have produced mixed results. Cecchetti and Krause 
(2002) find evidence that central bank transparency improves a measure of macroeconomic 
performance based on the variability of inflation and output – although not as strongly as 
does central bank credibility (quantified in terms of low past inflation outcomes). Demertzis 
and Hughes Hallett (2002) use the index of Eijffinger and Geraats to examine the impact of 
central bank transparency on economic outcomes, and interpret their results as suggesting 
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that, for the nine OECD countries rated by Eijffinger and Geraats, increased transparency 
tends to reduce the variance of inflation but increase the variance of output deviations from 
trend.
5 The mean levels of inflation and output are unaffected. Finally, by contrast with 
Demertzis and Hughes Hallett, Chortareas et al find that greater transparency, as measured 
by their own index, is associated with a lower average level of inflation. Carpenter (2004), 
however, is critical of both of these latter studies – and indeed of most of the econometric 
analysis of the effects of transparency – noting that “given the differing levels, types, and 
definitions of transparency, clear econometric results would be more surprising than 
convincing”. 
What all of these studies have in common is that they seek to identify differences in 
economic performance across countries and to attribute them to the characteristics of the 
communication regime. Performance, in this context, is usually measured in terms of either 
the volatilities of, or shifts in, key variables like inflation, output and interest rates. To put 
these studies in perspective, therefore, it is worth looking at the gross facts that need to be 
explained. Some summary statistics of these variables for a group of industrial countries are 
shown in Table 2. 
The summary statistics in Table 2 show, broadly, three things: 
•  Over the past two decades, there has been a substantial reduction in inflation levels 
in most of the selected countries, especially in those with initially high inflation rates, 
as well as a reduction in the variability of both inflation and output growth in most 
countries. 
•  There has been an even greater reduction in short-term interest rate volatility. 
•  Based on these summary measures, country performances have now become much 
more similar than they were in the two previous decades. 
Doubtless these trends are attributable to a number of factors that we cannot address here, 
but which would have to include improved macroeconomic policies. The aspect of economic 
performance most likely to be directly related to monetary policy communication 
arrangements is the reduction in interest rate volatility. It is plausible to attribute this to the 
improvements in transparency that have occurred over the same period, and a number of 
more detailed studies have done so (Muller and Zelmer (1999), Haldane and Read (2000)). 
But remaining cross-country differences in interest rate volatility are now small, and are 
swamped in any of these comparisons by the much larger historical movements. Given these 
gross facts, attempts to identify the economic effects of current differences in communication 
arrangements across countries seem unlikely to be convincing.
6 
 
                                                  
5  These findings, however, are based purely on simple, nine data point regressions of the relevant variable on 
Eijffinger and Geraats’s transparency measure. 
6  This is the conclusion of Coppel and Connolly (2003) in a study of the effects of transparency on financial 
market behaviour. Debelle (2003) similarly notes that macroeconomic outcomes in Australia since the 




Macroeconomic summary indicators 
Annual CPI inflation (average, percentage points)
1 
 
1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
United States  3.7  3.5  2.4  2.5 
Germany 1.3  3.8  1.2  1.7 
United Kingdom  4.7  4.7  2.6  2.4 
Canada 4.4  2.5  1.7  2.4 
Australia 7.7  3.3  2.2  2.7 
New Zealand  8.6  2.6  1.7  2.6 
Year-ended CPI inflation (standard deviation, percentage points)
1 
 
1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
United States  1.1  1.2  0.6  0.8 
Germany 1.2  1.2  0.6  0.4 
United Kingdom  0.9  2.3  0.3  0.4 
Canada 0.4  2.1  0.6  0.9 
Australia 1.3  1.7  0.9  0.3 
New Zealand  3.6  1.4  0.5  0.7 
Year-ended real GDP growth (standard deviation, percentage points) 
 
1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
United States  0.6  1.6  0.9  1.4 
Germany 1.1  2.6  0.8  1.4 
United Kingdom  1.2  2.1  0.4  2.0 
Canada 1.5  2.4  1.6  1.5 
Australia 1.6  2.1  0.8  1.0 
New Zealand
2 ...  3.2  2.0  1.3 
90-day bill yield (average absolute daily change, basis points) 
 
1985-89 1985-89 1985-89 1985-89 
United States  4.3  3.3  1.6  1.6 
Germany 4.3  3.4  3.0  1.9 
United Kingdom  8.2  4.2  1.6  0.6 
Canada 2.4  2.9  2.2  1.0 
Australia 12.2  3.0  1.7  1.2 
New Zealand  19.4  6.9  6.5  1.6 
1  CPI excluding GST and mortgage interest payments for Australia; CPI excluding GST and credit services for 
New Zealand; RPIX for the United Kingdom; headline CPI elsewhere.   
2    New Zealand year-ended real GDP 
growth data only available on a quarterly basis from 1988 Q3. 
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5.  The role of inflation forecasts in communication strategy 
The final general topic that emerges from the comparisons outlined above concerns the use 
of forecasts as a communication device. Some key characteristics of the forecasts published 
by advanced-country central banks are summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Provision of forecasts by central banks 
Central bank  Variables 















12-18 months  Range  No change 
Bank of Japan  GDP 
Inflation 




















1-2 years  Point  No change 
Sveriges 
Riksbank 











Quarterly 2-3  years Point  Endogenous 
Source: Central banks. 
 
The discussion below focuses on two aspects in particular: the monetary policy assumption 
embedded in the forecasts, and the broader question as to the degree of prominence given 
to inflation forecasts in the central bank’s communication strategy. 
5.1. The  policy  assumption 
The question of what policy assumption is built into the published inflation forecast has been 
much debated and, as argued below, can have a significant bearing on the way forecasts are 
used in central bank communication. As can be seen from Table 3, the majority of central 
banks construct their forecasts on an assumption that monetary policy is unchanged. The 
exception is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which uses the alternative approach of BIS Papers No 31  13
 
 
assuming endogenous monetary policy and therefore providing a forecast for the path of 
interest rates along with the other macroeconomic variables (including the exchange rate).
7 
The majority preference for the no-policy-change assumption has continued notwithstanding 
some criticism of that approach in the academic literature. One criticism is that the 
assumption is unrealistic and therefore non-transparent, since central banks will, in fact, 
generally expect interest rates to change over time (Martijn and Samiei (1999)). But the use 
of a technical assumption is not the same thing as non-transparency. If a decision-making 
committee does in fact make use of forecasts constructed on an unchanged policy basis, 
then transparency requires that it is those forecasts that should be released to the public. 
A more serious point is the technical criticism of the no-policy-change assumption. The issue 
here is that well designed forecasting models are generally either unstable or indeterminate 
when interest rates are permanently fixed; this reflects the Wicksellian point that under fixed 
interest rates the economy itself will be unstable.
8 But while this technical point is 
acknowledged, its importance should not be exaggerated. It is not inherently at odds with 
sensible theory to assume interest rates can be kept fixed for a temporary period, and most 
forecasting models have no trouble accommodating this kind of exercise. Certainly central 
bank forecasters have generally not found the problems associated with it to be 
insurmountable. 
Assuming these technical difficulties can be overcome, it may be conjectured that in many 
forecasting frameworks it would be possible to map forecasts from one approach to the 
other, at least over shortish forecast horizons. For example, given a set of short-term 
forecasts about how the economy would evolve with unchanged interest rates, one could 
deduce how interest rates would need to move in order to achieve a desired alternative 
outcome. That, presumably, is the type of mental exercise a policymaking committee might 
go through in using a no-policy-change forecast to inform its decisions. Viewed in this way, 
the two alternative forecasting approaches can be seen as two ways of summarising the 
same information. The information that a change in interest rates is needed could be 
expressed either by a forecast of the interest rate moves required to keep inflation on track or 
by a forecast showing the inflation rate diverging from the target if interest rates are not 
changed. Why, then, have the majority of central banks opted for the unchanged-policy 
approach? 
One reason, emphasised by Goodhart (2001), is likely to be the complexity of getting any 
forecasting process to agree on a projected time path for interest rates that can be 
adequately explained to the public. It is true that such forecasts can be routinely produced 
from economic models, but any attempt to debate the basis of the interest rate forecasts 
outside a modelling framework, and to explain them to the public, will still beg the question of 
why interest rates have to move as projected. 
Another reason is that, even if it is agreed that the two forecasting approaches can convey 
essentially the same information, there are important presentational differences between 
them. In particular, they are likely to convey different senses of the central bank’s propensity 
towards activism. The conventional approach presents the rationale for a policy decision in 
terms of the counterfactual question: what would happen if interest rates were kept 
unchanged? In an inflation targeting context, for example, it might explain a policy decision 
on the basis that inflation is expected to go off track in the absence of corrective action. This 
approach has the effect of framing the public discussion in terms of a presumption that 
                                                  
7  The Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank now also publish forecasts that assume interest rates follow the 
path embodied in market expectations. 
8  The use of a market interest rate profile does not overcome this problem since the interest rate path is still 
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interest rates stay unchanged unless the assessment of the economic outlook makes a case 
to the contrary. Presentationally, this is very different from offering a forecast based on a 
presumption that interest rates change, which is likely to convey a stronger sense of activism 
in the central bank’s policy approach. Since the evidence is that central banks are in fact 
quite gradualist relative to model predictions (Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida et al 
(1998)), the conventional way of presenting forecasts is likely to be more in keeping with the 
way policy is actually conducted. 
5.2.  Degree of prominence of the inflation forecasts 
Much of the debate in the theoretical literature assumes that all central banks have an 
inflation target in the sense that they must have some view of the optimum inflation rate that 
they are aiming for. The debate in the United States, as typified in recent speeches by Fed 
Governors Bernanke and Kohn, has been about whether this particular parameter should be 
revealed to the public.
9 This would be achieved by the Fed providing a numerical value for 
what it means by satisfactory price stability. As a proponent of an inflation target for the 
United States, Bernanke argues that a numerical target would reduce uncertainty about 
future inflation and confer economic benefits through reduced premiums for inflation risk. The 
opposing argument is that a numerical target would make the Fed’s communication less 
effective, by oversimplifying what are in fact a more complex set of objectives and 
encouraging an excessive focus on short-term deviations of inflation forecasts from the 
target. In other words, it would give the inflation forecasts too much prominence. Embedded 
in all this discussion is the idea that there is an optimal degree of emphasis on inflation 
forecasts in a central bank’s overall approach to communication. So the question arises, how 
much prominence is enough? 
The most extreme response to this question is what might be termed the “sufficient statistic” 
approach to communication. This approach would assert that the job of monetary policy is to 
set the interest rate at the unique level which, given current circumstances and expectations, 
brings the forecast of inflation to the target over a fixed period of time ahead (say, two years). 
The central bank would simply calculate a two-year-ahead inflation forecast under the 
unchanged policy assumption and, using an estimate of the responsiveness of the forecast 
to a change in the interest rate, could then determine the interest rate that would bring 
inflation to the target. So the inflation forecast would be a sufficient statistic for determining 
today’s required policy decision, and for explaining its rationale to the public. 
Probably no major central bank nowadays would say that this is how monetary policy is, or 
should be, conducted. However, the early rhetoric of inflation targeters did come close to 
asserting this position. Goodhart’s retrospective observation as a founding member of the 
MPC makes this clear: 
“When I was a member of the MPC I thought that I was trying, at each forecast 
round, to set the level of interest rates so that, without the need for future rate 
changes, prospective (forecast) inflation would on average equal the target at the 
policy horizon. This was, I thought, what the exercise was supposed to be”. 
(Goodhart (2001), p 177) 
                                                  
9  For a convenient summary of this debate, see the panel discussion session of the October 2003 Annual 
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, on the topic “Inflation targeting: prospects and 
problems”. As part of this session, Bernanke (2003) argued strongly in favour of the adoption of a formal 
inflation target by the Fed, while Kohn (2003) argued equally forcefully for maintenance of the status quo. BIS Papers No 31  15
 
 
More recently, there has been greater awareness that this degree of conceptual 
simplification is too extreme. For one thing, there is nothing magical about a two-year 
forecast horizon. Central banks generally select a forecast horizon of about that length for 
pragmatic reasons – it reflects a view that this kind of horizon is long enough to allow for the 
lags in monetary policy, and is about as far ahead as forecasts can be made with any 
acceptable degree of confidence. Nonetheless, it is recognised (see, for example, Bean 
(2003)) that a much longer horizon is potentially of interest to the policymaker. Hence, central 
banks need to develop ways of bringing into consideration factors that may be relevant to the 
policy decision but which would not fit into a conventional shorter-term inflation forecast. 
A further point is that central bank mandates do not generally stipulate the attainment of 
inflation targets on a fixed time horizon. Generally they allow some degree of flexibility, 
though the degree of flexibility does vary. Australia’s mandate (and also the revised 1999 
RBNZ mandate) is at the flexible end of the spectrum, and specifies that monetary policy 
aims to achieve the inflation target on average over the medium term.
10 The sufficient 
statistic approach described above is clearly incompatible with this formulation. Since the 
target is expressed as an average, there will at any point in time be multiple time paths for 
future inflation that would be consistent with it. This of course does not mean that policy is 
totally unconstrained, since only a course of action consistent with an expectation of 
achieving the target on average would be permissible. 
The point can be illustrated using the following scenario (see Figure 1). The diagram shows 
three hypothetical inflation forecasts associated with alternative (constant) settings of the 
policy interest rate, starting from a position where inflation is below the target. For the sake of 
argument it is assumed that the current level of interest rates is on the expansionary side of 
neutral, and generates path A, in which inflation is forecast to rise back to the target over a 
period of exactly two years. Thus the sufficient statistic approach, applied using a two-year 
horizon, uniquely fixes the policy rate at its current level. An alternative forecast trajectory 
(path B), if interest rates were cut, would return inflation to the target more quickly (in, say, a 
year) while a small rise in interest rates would mean inflation taking longer than two years to 
reach the target (path C). Of course, all of these scenarios would eventually imply an 
unstable upward drift in inflation in the long run if interest rates were not changed further. 
Thus there would have to be additional adjustments to policy over time that are not 
incorporated in the forecast assumption. But with appropriate corrective action in due course, 
any one of the alternative interest rates at the present point in time might be consistent with 
attainment of the inflation target on average in the medium term. The alternative longer-term 
paths might look something like those shown by the dotted lines in Figure 1. 
 
                                                  
10  An early source of confusion about this formulation was whether it implied a backward-looking correction of 
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How then should a central bank decide between these alternatives? In theory, an optimising 
central bank would need to take into account all available information affecting the probability 
distribution of the variables in its objective function (inflation and output) over the foreseeable 
future. So the aim would be to find the optimal path consistent with meeting the inflation 
objective on average. In practical terms this is likely to require taking several things into 
account. One is the trajectory of inflation at the end of the forecast period – is it rising, falling 
or stable? As noted by Stevens (2004), the interest rate that returns inflation to the target 
over some given horizon is not necessarily the one that keeps it there. So in some instances 
there might be a case for moving the policy rate now, even if the forecast end-point is at the 
target, to ensure that the inflation rate is not rising or falling too quickly when it gets there. 
Other considerations are those of macroeconomic stability, more broadly defined. Starting 
from a position where inflation is away from the target, the optimal speed of return will 
depend partly on what is happening to output, and also on the broader balance of risks to the 
economy, including those associated with asset and credit market developments. Elements 
of these considerations have entered into the policy decisions of the RBA in recent years, as 
documented in successive SMPs. The general principle, which is recognised in the policy 
mandate, is that the inflation target is a medium-term constraint, not a deterministic formula 
that requires information outside the short-term inflation forecast to be ignored. 
A specific point worth highlighting in this context is the relevance of the trajectory, in addition 
to the level, of inflation at the end of the forecast period. This is illustrated by two recent 
episodes in Australian monetary policy when the expected time path of inflation was being 
influenced by the temporary effects of large movements in the exchange rate. 
The first episode was the period around the policy easing that occurred in late 2001. Some 
key features of this period are summarised in Graph 1, which shows data for inflation and the 
cash rate as they were presented in the November 2001 SMP. In the early months of 2001, 
the cash rate had been sharply reduced, by a total of 125 basis points. This occurred against 
the backdrop of global economic downturn and what was assessed in the first half of that 
year as a prospect of relatively low inflation in Australia, with underlying inflation expected to 
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remain close to 2½% (this was the forecast in the May 2001 SMP). By the second half of the 
year it had become apparent that the short-term outlook was for higher inflation than 
previously anticipated, reflecting a larger and more extended pass-through of the earlier 
exchange rate depreciation into consumer prices. The August SMP thus revised up the 
short-term inflation outlook to 3%. The November SMP went slightly further, forecasting that 
underlying inflation would exceed 3% for a brief period. 
 
Figure 2 
Inflation and the cash rate 
November 2001 SMP 
 
1  Year-ended percentage change, excluding interest charges 
prior to 1998 Q4. 
Sources: ABS; RBA. 
 
Clearly, the decisions to lower the cash rate in September and October of that year were not 
the result of a purely mechanical response to short-run inflation forecasts. While both the 
August and November SMPs forecast that inflation would decline from the expected near-
term peak once the exchange rate effects faded, there was no suggestion that inflation would 
breach the target on the low side within a conventional forecast period. Rather, the rationale 
set out in the media statements accompanying the policy moves, and in the November SMP, 
was based on a combination of factors – the fact that inflation was expected to be declining 
in the latter part of the forecast period, and an assessment of more general risks to the 
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effect, a relatively benign inflation outlook beyond the near-term peak provided the flexibility 
for policy to respond to emerging risks to the wider economy. 
The second episode, when monetary policy was tightened in late 2003, represents broadly 
the reverse of this situation. Some key features are summarised as before in Figure 3, using 
the data as presented in the November 2003 SMP. A feature of the second half of 2003 was 
that the short-term inflation forecasts were being revised downwards, as a consequence of 
the substantial appreciation of Australia’s trade-weighted exchange rate over the previous 
year or so. The expected pass-through of this effect into consumer prices produced a 
shallow U-shaped inflation forecast so that, in the forecast reported in November 2003, 
inflation was expected to dip to 2% by mid 2004, subsequently rising to 2½% by the end of 
the forecast period. Monetary policy, in the event, was tightened in two steps, by a total of 
50 basis points in November and December. 
 
Figure 3 
Inflation and the cash rate 
November 2003 SMP 
 
1 Year-ended percentage change.    
2  Includes December 2003 
change in the cash rate. 
Sources: ABS; RBA. 
 
Once again, the rationale for these policy decisions was explained in terms of a broader set 
of factors than either the immediate (one or two quarters ahead) inflation outlook or the 
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the end of the forecast period was also clearly important. The explanatory announcements 
that accompanied the November and December decisions, and the subsequent discussion in 
the February 2004 SMP, emphasised that the immediate decline in inflation would be only 
temporary, and indicated that inflation would be not only back at the target mid-point, but also 
on a rising path, by the end of the forecast period. The second point was that prior to these 
decisions the policy stance had been highly expansionary. The implication of these two 
points was that, despite the expectation that it would decline in the short term, inflation would 
eventually exceed the target in the absence of corrective policy action. A third consideration 
presented in the Bank’s policy statements was the run-up in house prices and credit. This 
situation risked becoming a significant destabilising influence on the economy, in ways that 
could not be readily incorporated in a conventional macroeconomic forecast. Finally, there 
was a strong global recovery under way by that time, improving the environment for growth 
of the Australian economy. These additional factors argued against persisting with a highly 
expansionary policy setting for too long, even though the expected movement in inflation 
above the target was still some way off. 
The general observation suggested by these experiences is that it is unrealistic to expect an 
inflation forecast path on its own to represent all of the information that policy needs to take 
into account, even though it is obviously an important component. The degree of prominence 
given to inflation forecasts as a communication device is thus closely tied to questions about 
the specification of the policy framework itself. A heavy focus on inflation forecasts in the 
communication strategy is likely to be a more natural fit with regimes where the target is 
relatively tightly specified (that is, with narrow bands, relatively low tolerance of deviations 
from the target, and little emphasis on broader stability objectives). It will be less well suited 
to more flexible regimes which are more tolerant of short-run inflation variability and give 
greater weight to broader macroeconomic stability goals. 
That said, it is at least open to question whether the different policy regimes are as different 
in practice as their rhetoric implies. The comparisons presented earlier in Table 2 show that 
macroeconomic performance across a range of advanced countries has become much more 
similar in recent years than it was in the two previous decades. This may well be partly a 
result of common structural changes or changes in the nature of the shocks now occurring. 
But it is also plausible that, notwithstanding differences in rhetoric, monetary policies have 
become more similar. Particularly noteworthy is the degree of similarity in inflation 
performances, a result which is suggestive of similar degrees of tolerance to variability of 
inflation around what are seen as desirable levels. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is a high degree of similarity across countries in the 
inflation forecasts themselves. The statistical characteristics of published inflation forecasts 
for a group of inflation targeting countries are summarised below in Graph 3 and Table 4. 
This information shows that the forecast deviations of inflation from target are generally very 
small. In all these countries, inflation is virtually always forecast to be inside the target range 
at the end of the forecast period, and there is only one instance (in a total of over 
100  forecasts) of a central bank forecasting that inflation would breach its target at that 
horizon. 




Central bank inflation forecasts 
Deviation from target (percentage points) 
 
See Table 4 for notes. 
 
Table 4 
Statistical characteristics of central bank inflation forecasts 









































2    Aug  95  41   0.06   0.11  0  0 
Canada   Jan  03  12    –0.13  0.13  0  0 
Australia
3   Aug  96  37    0.01  0.27  1  1 
Sweden
4   Dec  97  32    0.07  0.23  0  2 
New 
Zealand   Feb  91  47    0.13  0.34  1    12 
1  For New Zealand, Sweden and Canada, the table covers the period since the central banks began publishing 
their inflation forecasts. For the United Kingdom, we commence in August 1995 when the revised reporting 
range for RPIX inflation was adopted. For Australia, the starting point is the RBA’s first quarterly Statement 
following the adoption of the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy 1996.   
2    Inflation forecasts based 
on constant interest rate expectations.   
3  Australian data in this table are calculated from unpublished point 
forecasts that underlie the inflation outlook presented in the RBA’s quarterly Statements. The forecasts refer to 
underlying inflation excluding tax effects.     
4    Latest forecast is based on market interest rate expectations. 
Previous forecasts were based on constant interest rate expectations. 
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A pattern of inflation forecasts that closely hugs the target is open to several possible 
interpretations. One is that inflation itself is much more stable than it used to be, and inflation 
expectations much better anchored. This being the case, inflation forecasts should broadly 
reflect that characteristic: if inflation rarely breaches the target, it seems to make sense that it 
will rarely be forecast to do so. There is no doubt a degree of validity in this. The difficulty, 
however, is that in most countries, inflation is forecast on the basis of unchanged policy, and 
so the forecast will not include the stabilising influence of the future policy actions that help to 
keep inflation on track. So unless policy is close to its optimum when the forecast is made, a 
diverging inflation path should be expected. This suggests a second possible interpretation, 
namely, that policy settings generally are, in fact, judged to be close to their conditional 
optimum at the time when forecasts are made. This would mean that with unchanged policy, 
inflation is usually not expected to deviate greatly from the centre of the target. Again, there 
is likely to be some validity in this. If a central bank was in a position where it could 
confidently forecast inflation to go seriously off track, policy would already have been 
changed. A third possible interpretation is just that inflation is hard to forecast and so, given 
limited information, it is hard to come up with a medium-term forecast of inflation too far away 
from its statistical mean. It may, indeed, be particularly difficult to do so if a strong policy 
signal is likely to be inferred from such a forecast. 
The point of making these observations is not to argue against forecasts per se, but merely 
to comment on the weight given to them as a communication device. Inflation forecasts in 
practice are highly stable around their targeted values, as the preceding discussion shows. 
Whatever interpretation is put on this fact, it seems unrealistic to expect forecasts of this 
nature to do the work of an all-encompassing summary statistic for monetary policy. 
6. Conclusion 
A comparison of different country experiences indicates that there is no single model for the 
design of an inflation target. Inflation targeting regimes differ in a number of respects, 
including the amount of flexibility they allow for inflation to vary around the target, the way 
they specify the time horizon for achieving the target, their reporting and accountability 
procedures, and the role of forecasts in the communication strategy. In this context, the 
Australian approach can be characterised as one which is relatively flexible and, in 
comparison with many other central banks, places less emphasis on forecasts as a 
communication tool. 
It may be, however, that these are differences more of presentation than of substance. What 
all inflation targeters have in common is a public commitment to a numerical goal, the 
existence of some framework of accountability for achieving it, and a central role for the 
target as a device for explaining policy decisions to the public. This common strategic 
approach has brought substantial improvements in economic outcomes for all inflation 
targeters, in the form of reductions in both the level and variability of inflation, lower financial 
market volatility and consistent economic growth. Australia’s performance in these respects 
has been at least as good as those of the other early adopters of inflation targeting. 
Notwithstanding the broad similarities of approach, an important ongoing area of difference 
among central banks concerns the role given to inflation forecasts in the communication 
strategy. Economic theory suggests that a heavy emphasis on inflation forecasts, in 
combination with other features that enforce a tight pre-commitment to inflation control, may 
be useful in building credibility for a newly established policy regime. But experience also 
shows that monetary policy in practice needs to take into account a broader range of 
information than can be summarised in the inflation forecast. If so, an excessive focus on 
inflation forecasts as a communication tool may be misleading or unhelpful in explaining the 
rationale for policy decisions, or may contribute to a costly loss of flexibility. 22  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
The balance between these considerations will depend on the extent to which the specific 
credibility-building features of the policy regime (namely, the heavy focus on inflation 
forecasts and pre-commitment devices) remain a priority once low inflation expectations 
have been established. It is not surprising that, after the “lost decades” of the 1970s and 
1980s, many central banks adopted these features to try to assist in the process of re-
establishing their anti-inflation credibility. But with that battle largely won, central banks may 
find that they are now able to give greater weight to the broader stability objectives of 
monetary policy without compromising longer-term inflation control. 
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